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This is not an argument for or against War. Nor does this
paper concern itself with the morality of war. While certain
truths are self evident, there will be no implicit statements con-
cerning the military feasibility of the use of any particular
instrument of war.
In the development of the paper, it has been found expedient
to assume total-population casualties of 30$, 50% and 70#. The
rigidity of these figures, while explicit, is not intended to con-
note precision in the assumption. The methods whereby an enemy
might achieve these casualty rates are left to the discretion of
the reader. However, the primary weaponry is presumed to be
nuclear. For purposes of simplification and ease of construction,
the casualties were proportionately profiled from major population
centers
•
The reader is asked to stipulate that this serves a twofold
purpose. First; it affords a degree of freedom from synthesizing
a Strategic Target List, and freedom from foolish interpolation of
assertions extraneous to the argument. More important, it offers
the reader information that is within the realm of common knowl-
edge; i.e., San Francisco, California is somewhat larger than




THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITION OF TERMS USED
The nature and methods of warfare are continually changing.
It is not impertinent to suggest that in the event of inter-
national war, targets might not be limited to that class termed
'purely military'. The post-attack political and economic
strength of the United States will be directly dependent on the
immediate reaction capabilities of the surviving population.
An economic allocation and distribution of all resources
necessary to maximise our National posture will then be of primary
concern. One facet pertinent to minimizing the reaction time and
maximizing this posture may have been overlooked in the past. At
the present, no method is known to exist whereby the qualifications
of the individual could be readily correlated with existing
physical resources, within a framework of national priority, for
the purpose of maximizing this posture.
I. THE PROBLEM
Statement of the Problem
. It was the purpose of this study
(1 ) to indicate the environmental restrictions of the organization
best qualified to assess the post-attack damage to the United
States; (2) to show a relationship between the complementary
civil-municipal and industrial span of control; (3) to discuss

problem-areas incurred by large casualty rates and the resulting
difficulties in maximizing our national posture; and (4) to
propose one course of action toward more rapidly regaining maximum
utilization of productive capability.
Importance of the study . The productive capability of the
United States has long been a recognized factor in the world's
economy. A United States capable of maintaining a post-attack
posture of decision and purpose would be less vulnerable to
interlopers. The United States would achieve post-attack inter-
national recognition in accordance with the degree of the appar-
ency of that strength. The reflexive post-attack capability of
this National productive entity has not been recently tested.
Pre-attack and mid-attack plans and capabilities are continually
reviewed by the Executive Departments, applicable agencies and
groups. The responsibility for Civil Defense was turned over to
the Department of Defense on 1 August, 1961. From this, one can
logically infer that the immediate post-attack coordination and
regulation of civil effort will be in accordance with instructions
authorized by the President, via the Department of Defense to
local authorities. A rapidly implementable planned course of
action pertaining to the maximization of our post-attack
industrial-economic posture is, therefore, axiomatic. In this
study, an attempt was made to ascertain the feasibility, establish




II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
Casualty * Any person dead, dying or incapable of normal
productive effort.
Productive Entity , Industrial Entity . Throughout this re-
port, the above terms are used interchangeably and should be
interpreted as definitive of the sum total of the productive
capability of the titular organization to which they refer.
Skills profile . The productive capability of any organi-
zation presumes an operating balance between various levels of
intelligence and technical competence within specific fields of
endeavor.
War-Game . As used herein, War-Game is the systematic
assimilation, rational manipulation and intelligent interpretation
of data relating probable strategic and tactical results of
attacking systems operating in a defensive environment.
.t
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The amount of literature, both specific and general, per-
taining to the functions and responsibilities of Civil Defense is
massive. Therefore, only a review of such data pertinent to the
present argument will be included,
I. EARLY DEVOLUTION OF THE OFFICE
OF CIVIL DEFENSE
The Office of Civil Defense developed from assignments and
responsibilities of the National Security Resources Board. The
following substantially condenses the organizational assignments
of this responsibility,
"In 1953, the Board was abolished under Reorganization Plan
No, 3 of 1953, and its duties were assigned to the Office of
Defense Mobilization, which became a permanent part of the
Executive Office of the President. In 1958, ODM absorbed the
Federal Civil Defense Administration, and became the Office of
Civil and Defense Mobilization."
Robert K. Carr, Marver H. Bernstein and Donald H.
Morrison, American Democracy in Theory and Practice (New York:
Rinehart and Company, Inc, 1960), p, 793.

II. CURRENT AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICE
OF CIVIL DEFENSE
On 1 August 1961, the President of the United States, by-
executive order, transferred basic responsibility for civil
2
defense to the Department of Defense, During this transfer,
certain functional powers and responsibilities were held by the
Office of Civil Defense Mobilization, which was at this time
renamed The Office of Emergency Planning. Primarily, these
responsibilities include
:
Planning continuity of state and local governments, the
natural disaster relief program, the defense mobilization
program, «the strategic and critical materials stockpiling
program.
The Secretary of Defense is specifically charged with "the
development and execution of a program to minimize the effects of
attack, including informing and educating industry and the public
in methods of survival. This includes a fallout shelter program, a
warning and communications system, and a program to assist state
and local governments in such post-attack community services as
health and sanitation, maintenance of law and order, firefighting
2
A McGraw-Hill Special Report, Nuclear Attack and
Industrial Survival (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company,
Inc, 1961) p. S16.
3 Ibid.

and control, debris clearance, traffic control, provision of water
supplies .
"
Peculiarly, certain responsibilities assigned the Secretary
of Defense, specifically those pertaining to the maintenance of
law and order, firefighting and traffic control appear to func-
tionally overlap the municipal-interest areas assigned to the
Office of Emergency Planning.
The current organization for the Federal civil defense
program, by design, meets all the constitutional, statuatory and
customary requirements for civil control of the military. The
Secretary of Defense, by assumption of the post of Head, Office of
Civil Defense, has assumed an enormous and divergent responsibil-
ity.
The connotations of the word 'defense' infer a disparity of
the meanings as applied to the job of 'maintaining a deterent
capability' and 'preparing for enemy attack'. The Secretary
evidently appreciates this disparity; for concerning the latter,
he states:
It is my considered judgement that this is a reasonable and
prudent program—and that it is the best program we can have,
measured against the other priorities of our national life.
The Federal Civil Defense Program, being Federally
4Ibid.
5
R. S. McNamara, " Fallout Protection ." Department of
Defense Booklet H-6, (December 1961), Foreword.
.-
administered, is separate from local and/or state jurisprudence.
This separation has amounted to almost an aloofness insofar as its
effects are felt at the municipal level. And yet, the Secretary
has delegated immense responsibility when he charges:
Shelter, warning, radiological monitoring, training and
education are all parts of a total community civil defense
program. The responsibility for integrating these parts, and
relating the whole to the needs and capabilities of the
community, necessarily falls on the State and local civil
defense program.
III. MUNICIPAL RESPONSE
It is extremely fortuitous that the local and state govern-
ments represent a comparatively large and singularly motivated
regulatory force-in-being. This force would be alerted and
utilized during emergencies. But, to be effective, these local
law enforcement units will require directive support from
centralized authority. Interviews with municipal officials have
indicated a certain minimum level of assistance deemed desirable.
This support should include instructions of policy and guidance;
indoctrination of police in radiological techniques; national
coordination of any planning, training or police effort; communi-
cation of any warning or post-attack assessment. Such guidance,
in order to be nationally assimilated, must be promulgated
nationally.
Ibid ,, p. 46.

Service schools, such as the Navy's Nuclear Weapons Training
Centers represent an untapped source of instructional competency.
These schools, under the stimulus of centralized direction, could
be effectively utilized to indoctrinate municipal officials in
nuclear effects. This municipality-oriented program could be
complemented by a more sophisticated, unclassified, public program
of instruction via television, radio and the press.
By such methods could the informational gap be continually





THE ENVIRONMENT OF CIVIL DEFENSE
It is not too peculiar that the nuclear weapon, conceived
as a purely military device, should have brought about what may be
called the paroxysm of the pariah. The weapon's extremely large
radius of effect against targeted groups of humanity apparently
necessitated other extremes by other groups. The largely
uninformed citizenry became alarmed when they realized that here
was a weapon which had been field-tested against two non-military
targets.
War, and the horrible imagery of decimation, roosted like a
hungry vulture overlooking Main Street, Home Town, U. S. A, In
the rabid conjecture that followed this realization, when some of
the Manhattan Project scientists professed to know Sin, some of
these scientists also professed to know politics. The politicians
lagged in their study of science, but other professions spoke out,
singly and en masse*
I. CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE SCHOLARS
On the tenth of November, 1961, 180 members of the faculties
of Boston, Brandeis, Harvard and Tufts Universities, and of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, addressed an 'Open Letter'
to the President of the United States, On 1 December, 1961, some

620 facility members from California Institutions of learning
followed suit.
Some three months after the Secretary of Defense had been
charged with the duties of Civil Defense, these learned professors
7had this to say:
We are deeply disturbed by current developments in the
field of civil defense. It appears to us that the prodigious
energy of our people is being channeled into wrong directions
for wrong reasons; and that continuation of this trend may be
extremely dangerous to the nation and to civilization itself.
The letter goes on to make economic, military, political
and moral pronouncements that are properly awesome:
For example, it is said that civil defense is a deterrent.
If it really protected us to the extent necessary for survival
it might be; but at present its only deterrent value lies in
the demonstration to the Soviet Union that we expect to have a
war. Even on this point, it might in fact be argued that this
is more likely to precipitate a pre-emptive attack than to
deter one.
The letter builds to its didactic climax with:
To sum up, we believe that although the present civil
defense program, and in particular the construction of fallout
shelters, might save a small fraction of the population in a
nuclear war, this potential gain is more than offset by the
fact that such activity prepares the people for the acceptance
of thermonuclear war as an instrument of national policy. We
believe that this acceptance would substantially increase the
likelihood of war—a war which would be permanently fatal to
our democratic society, even if not to all of us.
This Godivian pedantry finishes with a plea for the
President to lead the nation forward on a race towards peace.
n
San Francisco Chronicle, December 1, 1961, p, k KG
10

This scholarly epistle is included as representative of the well-
read, intestinally-dead class of erudite pronouncements on civil
defense. But as to whether or not civil defense is integral to
the national deterrent posture—
McNamara disagrees. He believes that the Russians would
not be too concerned with how many Americans they could kill,
but how many Russians the Americans could kill in a counter-
strike. This counter-strike force, he believes, is the true
deterrent.
II. CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE POLITICIANS
The astutely philosophical legislators, representing yet
another group, also give warning of the effects of nuclear weapons.
Senator Stephen M. Young, a most vocal critic, says of
9
civil defense:
Every hour around the clock nearly $12,000 of your tax money
is channeled into federal, state and local programs of Civil
Defense. And every cent-more than $1 billion in the last 10
years-is being wasted.
Senator Young delineates the devastation of nuclear attack
in these words:
Only in the far reaches of the back country, where fall-out
would be the sole threat, could shelters hope to leave us any
survivors, perhaps 10 percent of our population...Radioactive
dust would cover everything, retaining its killing power for
months, maybe years. What would survivors use for food?
San Francisco Chronicle, March 18, 1961, p, 21.
9
Stephen M. Young, "The U. S. Should Scrap Civil Defense,"
True Magazine
. (December, 1961 ), pp 57, 59, 120.
11
.
For water? For air? What could they do to help themselves
before plague and disease set in and finished the work of
annihilation?
The Senator concludes with this very pertinent and astute
observation:
Our only hope for defense rests in our ability to settle
the explosive world situation and to retain strong powers of
retaliation until we have done so. In lieu of universal
disarmament, our offensive power is what constitutes genuine
civil defense*
Another respected political personage is Mr, Nelson A,
Rockefeller, The honorable governor of the State of New York
criticizes the lag in civil defense effort in the appropriately
dispassionate analysis:
A lagging effort cannot be excused by our conviction that
nuclear war is a tragedy and that we must strive by all
honourable means to assure peace. Strategically, we must
remove temptation from an aggressor who might risk an all-out
war if he thought he could destroy our most valuable asset
—
our people,
III. CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE PHYSICIST
A more apocalyptic treatise might be that of Doctor Edward
Teller, who argues:
It is not too late for the United States to save itself and
the Free World. By taking measures clearly within our reach,
"Charade of Civil Defense", The Nation. Vol 190, June 11,
I960, p. 509.
Edward Teller, "Plan For Survival", The Saturday Evening
Post. (February 17, 1962), pp. 32-37.
12
I f
we can avert an all-out nuclear war* Having achieved that
much, we can build a permanent world peace.
Doctor Teller, who has a working knowledge of the design,
yields and effects of thermonuclear weapons, takes the view that
one should prepare in order to defend oneself. He sets the basis
of his argument in a proposal containing four measures of defense.




Develop an adequate passive defense in the form of
shelters, civil-defense organizations, and means of rehabil-
itating the nation after attack. A nuclear attack on the
United States would be horrible beyond imagination, but we
must not only imagine it-we must prepare for it. An unpre-
pared nation invites attack. Properly prepared, we can survive.
2. Having survived an attack, be able to strike the second
blow. We have barely begun to build a strong second-strike
nuclear force. This is different from our older concept of
massive retaliation. In making certain that we could absorb
and return an all-out nuclear attack, we attain a major but
limited adjective: our survival as an organized society with an
organized industrial complex and an advancing civilization. If
Russia knows that we can survive and counterattack, she will
never directly attack us.
3« Prepare for limited warfare—limited in scope, area,
objectives, but not in weapons. Whenever Russia's ambiguous
aggression degenerates into an outright attack on our allies, a
localized, limited nuclear war should be our answer. It will
be the alternative to an all-out, disastrous, nuclear world
war. To prepare for a limited war, we must develop new kinds
of diplomacy, battle tactics, nuclear weapons and fighting men.
Today we are incapable of waging a limited nuclear war. We are
unprepared politically, diplomatically, militarily and
psychologically.
4. Having fully attained a passive defense, a second-strike
nuclear force and a limited-warfare potential, we must realize
that these three steps have bought us nothing but time. We
must use that time to establish a lawful community of nations
13

to ensure lasting peace. Our goal can be nothing less than a
world government based upon the principles of freedom and
democracy.
Doctor Teller denies the existence of the threat of
absolute destruction by any absolute weapon, but does admit to the
existing threat of fear. He calls attention to the literary
license employed by the author of the impressive novel, "On The
Beach", and the perverting influence of such fiction. Even more
important to the responsible reader was his logical and orderly
presentation of the comparative costs of preservation. These
realistic criteria for survival, though expensive, offer hope to
those who care to consider the consequences of nuclear attack.
Doctor Teller concludes his argument with a cautionary
request for an ideal supranational alliance of free democracies as
a safeguard to minimize the chances of war. The second, third and
forth points of Doctor Teller's article deal with post-attack
recovery, limited warfare and national strategy respectively. The
majority of the supplementary and complementary portions of the
article are arguments in support and in defense of the first
sentence of the first point; to "Develop an adequate passive
defense in the form of shelters, civil-defense organizations, and
means of rehabilitating the nation after attack".
Although Doctor Teller's article is very broad in scope, it
is refreshingly direct and positive, and does not fall victim to





GENERAL DEPARTMENTAL PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES
There are certain limiting generalized results of a large
scale nuclear attack that can be predicated from pure rationality.
The casualty rates of nuclear weapon effects are largely academic,
with the pertinent exceptions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Technicians who object to the artificiality of the Nevada tests
are yet presumed to be reluctant to sacrifice a city such as New
York in the interest of accuracy. It follows, then, that the
estimates of effects generally reflect the limits of the initial
assumptions. There is a cautious pessimism in attack, and an
extreme pessimism in defense*
I. STIPULATED EFFECT ASSUMPTIONS CATEGORIZED BY
RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENTS
Food : Permanent large-scale contamination by fallout can
12
not be substantiated by any physical hypothesis. Therefore, it
is suggested that food will not constitute a major problem in the
immediate post-attack period. A self-serving theory, in the case
of a large-scale attack, could suggest the probability of more
12
Samuel Glasstone, Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington,
D. C; Government Frinting Office, June 1957), Chap. 9.

food surviving than people. Canned and packaged food protected by
any structure that survives blast and thermal effects would suffer
little direct fallout. The adequacy of potable water is a matter
of concern for reservoir and river consumers.
The detailed Food Plan is under the aegis of the Department
of Agriculture. This department also assumes responsibility for
the protection of vegetation and animals against radiological,
chemical and biological warfare.
Shelter : The Housing and Home Finance Agency is responsible
for plans pertaining to emergency housing and community services in
the immediate post-attack period. During this period, shelter
availability will be largely a function of the degree of compre-
hension and cooperation of the surviving populace. Essential
buildings that are available can be decomtaminated and utilized
during the radiological-decay period.
Clothing ; It is possible to round out the Food-Shelter-
Clothing trio by a bit of redundancy. Here again, it is probable
that more clothes than people will survive a large-scale attack.
The problem of personal cleanliness in areas of contaminated water
supply will be a function of this degree of surplusage of clothing.
Services : In the field of services, the most casual of
investigations reveal an almost frightening vulnerability.
The drag-sensitive design of practically all elements of
communication invites a high rate of interruptions and failures.
16

Exterior, but complementary to the potentiality of hardware failure
will be the substantial weakening of the human link in the commu-
nication chain. Even the less astute can assume a certain degree
of isolation during the immediate post-attack period
.
To alleviate this condition, the major common carriers are
hardening their facilities. Partial relief is generated by the
observation that commercial organizations, such as Bell System,
Western Union etc., possess crews trained in emergency repair.
Utilities : Utilities, in general, are extremely vulnerable
to large scale attack. The concentration of power generation
sites and the drag-sensitivity of power distribution systems
certify service interruptions. Hydraulic shock or pressure loss
will incapacitate water and gas mains outside of the immediate
target area. The probable lack of adequate water head and power
will immediately overburden even those adjacent sewage systems that
remain intact.
Repair and reinstatement of these services is dependent on
a comparatively small group of highly skilled technicians. One
partially compensating qualification can be accorded the fact that
the majority of these crews received their training during actual
fire and flood disasters.
Medical ; Services dealing with the health of the individual
are under the aegis of the U. S. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare. Here the limiting criteria for the determination of
17

overall efficiency appears to be critically dependent upon the
number of people trained to handle casualties. The sophistication
and efficiency of this training effort will naturally be a
function of the degree of symptomatic-severity of the casualties.
The very nature of the thermal and radioactive radiation conse-
quent to large-scale nuclear detonation would seem to preclude a
high degree of mass competence in prophylactic measures.
The most practical solution is probably the apparent. The
Department has distributed 1900 of the 200-bed hospital units.
750 additional units are planned. All will have a 30 day medical
supply and these hospital units are to be located exterior, but
adjacent to population centers. The Department is readying a
'Medical Self-Help 1 program to provide basic medical training to
civil defense groups and industrial disaster organizations.
Registration ; The Post Office Department has the current
responsibility for the registration of individuals and family
groups. Without a pre-arranged simplified typeing and cataloguing
of the desired information, this post-attack exercise would
present only statistical migratory data. In fact, most commu-
nities have established alternate means of registration via such
diverse groups as the Police departments, libraries or county
clerks offices. This lack of coordination can only be due to the




II, POST ATTACK ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS
The above has been generally concerned with the diverse
competence of the many people supporting the productive entity of
the United States. Problems incident to the early post-attack
period would be basically problems associated with national sur-
vival. These problems could be best assumed and best coordinated
by the organization-in-control during and immediately following an
attack. Since the emergency would be National, the controlling
organization should be National,
In order for a centralized authority to make a sensible
comprehensive decision regarding a post-attack course of action,
it would be necessary that he have ready access to a fairly
precise estimate of the extent of damage.
The area-of-interest of this centralized authority would
expand, in time, from the immediate concern about counter-strike
capability to include, later, the post-attack industrial-recovery
capability. The time-lapse between these two concern-periods would
probably be inversely proportional to the then existing level of
confusion.
The field of battle has increased, For the first time in
history, a field commander must command inexperienced undisciplined
civilian 'troops'. No longer can simple orders elicit a predict-
able response. Without intelligent comprehensive consideration of
19

such diverse variables as money, meterology, men, materials and
morality; no viable civilization can be rapidly restored. For
those responsible few, this becomes a matter of data comprehension
versus misinformed apprehension*
III. THE SKILLED-WORKER TARGET
The below listed casualty-spreads, for reasons of gradient
simplification, are assumed to be proportional to area population
densities. No attempt has been made to specify exact numerical
and titular mortalities.
It is pertinent to observe here, that industrial and
population concentrations coincide. Further, it is possible to
achieve the casualty levels stipulated by specifying total destruc-
tion for certain strategic cities and ignoring their neighbors.
This was not deemed realistic a Therefore, the listing of a city by





Several questions pertaining to the accumulation, prepa-
ration and disposal of cadavers are irritatingly obvious. Would
racial or religious prejudice preclude mass decontamination and
burial? What would be the best method of allaying the fears and
20

debilitating the sensibilities of generically interested survivors?
Embalming fluid and technician shortages preclude normal
preparation. Limited supplies of calcium-carbonate portend area
contamination in the case of untreated disposition.
How much petroleum would the crematorium require?
How best to police the mentally unbalanced ghouls that such
mass decimation might spawn?
How much time can the nation allocate to dispose of the dead
and segregate, for efficient treatment, the wounded?
What is the optimum ratio of morale to morality?
But after the shock, the hysteria and the dead had subsided;
what then?
It is technically doubtful that any true measure of
relative victory could be rapidly assessed. However, the national
ego requires that an English-speaking voice announce; "We won".
It is just at this time that the organizational results of
intelligent planning can alter the course of future events.
This figure of 54 million casualties could be achieved by a
strike concentrated on our Industrial 'Glass Jaw', This is the
roughly-rectangular area bounded on the west by Chicago, the south
to St, Louis, then east to Washington, thence northeast to Boston,
If the potential enemy were to desire a minimum weapon
effort for maximum strategic effect, this would be the logical
impact area. Holding to the original assumption of a gradient
21

rate of casualties, this attack would create 21 million specialized
and supporting job vacancies in the critical industries area. This
is the prime geographic area for the manufacture of durable and
capital goods.
The basic reduction in numerical population, which would
debilitate the national population only to that level held during
1940, does not properly specify the qualitative loss in industrial
capability.
For rapid reconstruction, it is apparent that separative
plant diversification could not be tolerated; although individual
stockholders might suffer pecuniary losses. Maximum productive
efficiency, for all critical goods, would be dependent on the rapid
correlation and juxtapositioning of men, materials and machines.
In the interest of minimizing the effects of individual dislocation,
all routine labor functions should be automated as early in the
reconstruction phase as practicable.
Specific priorities, including the order of magnitude of
production, must be carefully established and continually
monitored to achieve the best possible balance of the productive
profiles
•
An intelligent and perceptive Wage and Price control must
be established quite early during such a reconstruction phase in




Systematic comprehensive monitoring of such diverse and
complex data infers a sophisticated Electronic Data Processing
system. Such a system should be capable of War-Gaming the National
entity. Statistical data from such War-Games would enable the
Chief Executive to attain certain planning courses-of-action.
These propositions could be extrapolated into National Recovery
Plans, and promulgated to regional Civil Defense Headquarters*
These statistical data should serve to generate a prediction
of a desired industrial profile for all levels of damage and
desired recovery rates. These data should indicate relative per-
centages of national industrial effort in specific complementary
areas of technical specialty*
Since this would not be a free-competition economy,
extremely sensitive and carefully selected data inputs would be
essential. The degree of academic application should not be so
studied, however, as to be ©missive.
Culpable errors in industrial assessment would result in
incorrigible waste » Production standards and quality control must
be realistically balanced against criticality of needs.
Essential skills allocation : Preceptive changes in the
industrial profile might range from a probable reduction in such a
minor service-industry, as television repair, in order to augment
the manufacture of electronic control devices or electrical
machinery. While this example is patently a cross-industry
23

transfer; a more efficient allocation, without such gross dislo-
cation, might be from an independent retail repair service to
commercial repair of essential communication devices.
Relocation of essential skills ; To illustrate a possible
worker-reallocation. Within such job fields as the highly
competitive gasoline service stations (286,000 employees) reposes
a source of various mechanical aptitudes. For the majority of
these workers, their work is both vocation and avocation. These
individuals could realize their mechanical ambitions (and supple-
ment the 154,000 automobile mechanics) under a slightly artificial,
well directed control program. Alternately, the available
petroleum products would then be retailed by non-essential dislo-
cated typesetters or variety store clerks, A portion of the more
qualified automotive mechanics might be best utilized in the
repair of heavy equipment allocated to reconstruction. Mobility,
for purposes of morale, should be voluntary insofar as the
exigencies of the requirements-profile would permit.
The optimum effort-allocation to such diverse commodities
as soap, sewing machines and shoes must be ordered to achieve
maximum survivor productivity. The ramifications of whiskey
rationing should be carefully weighed against the social and eco-
nomic penalties of illicit alcohol manufacture.
Requirements : This ordered reconstruction will require, in
addition to men and material, time. The results of a National
2k

War-Game might furnish an insight into the amount of time required
for the various stages of economic recovery, A program of gradual
reduction of martial law and governmental controls could then be
forecast. This Executive Calendar of Control would serve to alert
local and municipal authorities of impending administrative vacua
within areas of common interest. This calendar might also serve
to reassure the scholars of political history.
Electronic Data Processing System Requirements : Any massive
manipulation of manpower would require classification far exceeding
that of the military induction system during World War II, Twice
as many men to be mobilized in days instead of years.
Coordinated manipulation of this total assimilation of
skills demands a careful evaluation of methods, and a rational
interpretation of national goals.
The intent? Qualitative efficiency achieved with maximum
utility and minimum dislocation.
Selection of pertinent skills ; Even a casual investigation
reveals that the cataloguing of miniscule individual skills would
only serve to confuse data output interpretation. This, in turn,
would saturate the analytical processes , A natural point of
administrative initiation might be to catalogue only those profes-
sional individuals possessing a personal income exceeding some
minimum value. The rationale being that those individuals contrib-
uting to the economy are important to the economy. Non-critical
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semi-parasitic skills (such as entertainment and advertising)
could be selectively culled.
The Internal Revenue Service is currently assigning each
13
taxpayer a number. This number, which is to be utilized in
checking on the correctness of individual returns, could be readily
complemented with a skills-qualification indexing code.
It might be eminently practical to index and catalogue
skilled individuals currently in retirement. With the passage of
the annual Federal Income Tax reporting period, individual records
could be corrected to reflect the transfer of skills from the
active roll to the retired list.
The above should not be construed to infer an argument for
a Super Department combining the functions of Commerce and
Treasury. The functions required apparently catalyze on or about
the Bureau level. Previous Executive pronouncements indicate that
such functions should operate under the aegis of the Secretary
of Defense*
50% Casualties
90 million casualties. The population level would be
reduced to that existing during 1900, Cadaver handling capabil-
ities would be markedly decreased, even though the fatality
incidence might be spread over a period of months. Definite mass
13
^The San Francisco Chronicle
. Friday, March 2, 1962, p. 3.
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disposal procedures would be mandatory, "Bury thy neighbor" would
not suffice.
The penalty of lowering National morale (an indeterminate
quality) would act to mitigate and retard rapid industrial
recovery. Positive programming and administration would be
absolutely necessary.
Speculative academic extrapolation, in the medico-social
sciences, could assist in estimating the rate of recovery of the
National will. Such a study might indicate the amount and direc-
tion of a semi-panaceac program of propaganda.
In the national trauma following such decimation, a system
of previously authorized job-assignments might assist in allevi-
ating individual disturbances in the survivors.
A point readily apparent here is that certain psychological
classifications should not be delegated traumatic-inducing chores.
Without arguing the question of the personal desirability
of emerging from a shelter into such decimation, there is a
limiting assumption-of-order in a pre-attack coding of individual
qualities. Certain non-restrictive qualifications could be
numerically assessed on driver licences, Social Security cards or
other identification.
Skills classification ; It is about this percentage-casualty
point that individual classification fails to serve a pre-
programmed recovery effort. With such massive eradication of
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entire classes of skills, any realistic recovery plan must include
provision for equally impressive talent importation.
Preparation for such a scale of international recruiting
should be Federally formulated and administered through American-
owned businesses abroad.
The legality of such action, with its direct economic
implications, would be a function of the degree of foreign labor
surplus and indigenous economic and social pressures. It is
obvious here, that the talent-assessment should not extend below
the level of the manufacturing entity. For maximum efficiency,
entire plants should be recruited. If such a proposed course-of-
action was accepted by our strategic planners, then it might be
pertinent to suggest that courses in Biglish language could be
offered by these overseas plants. This assumption is also self-
serving. It stipulates that decimation would not be world-wide,
but it does point out the problem of awakening some morning to find
India the worlds largest Industrial entity.
A cautious sub-rosa cataloguing of available professoral
talent could operate to rapidly reestablish our educational
capability. The amelioration offered by a statistical reduction
in student numbers would be offset by the penalty of geographic
dispersal. A rapid consolidation into specific schools of study
might propose a productive efficiency.
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International cooperation would be required in so many-
fields as to materially affect even a national effort at trans-
porting this imported work force. One could only hope for a sur-
viving extra-national George Catlett Marshall.
10% Casualties
126 million dead and dying. 54 million extra-urban sur-
vivors. The population would numerically approximate that of 1S80.
A hypothetical extrapolation to this subordinate level of
productive individuals indicates that the casualty figure of 70%
was largely an academic supposition. Systematic, orderly cadaver
disposition would be virtually impossible. Treatment of the
symptomatic would be spasmodic at best, and largely ineffectual.
The operative validity of any worker-skills analysis would be of
such a low order and dependent on so many variables of assimilation
and system input, that no rational or concrete productive profile
would emerge. However, it is proposed that the skills-profile,
while more sophisticated, would approximate the capability level
of the iSSC^s. With the attendant dispersal of this semi-skilled
working group, directed communications would be difficult.
These largely extra-urban survivors would be primarily an
agrarian group located in comparatively isolated semi-insular
community-islands clustered about scattered municipalities. Unless
mobilized by Federal effort through strong communication links,
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these communities might tend to remain agrarian due to systemic
lethargy. Interests could devolve wherein group identity would
become superior to national identity. However, they would have an
occupational assurance of a mediocre form, of survival. Security*
This might be all one would desire.
Immigration t Large scale selective immigration would be
needed in order to occupy territorial and technical frontiers.
Labor requirements for agrarian survival would presumably
encourage fecundity, even though genetic mutations would be
probable.
It would not be necessary to obtain numerical superiority
in labor-importation in order to significantly modify the religious
and political beliefs of the indigenous survivors.
The indoctrination of such a heterogeneous force in the
principles of Republican Democracy would entail a phenomenal edu-
cational effort. Perhaps this would be the proper point in
history for an autocratic impressment of Democracy on all ethnic
groups
.
Factors common to the assumed casualty levels
There is a blatancy to the three pertinent factors common
to the above listed casualty rates. First, there is a planning-
need to relate National goals to survivor capability. Secondly,
there is a requirement for an assessment of available skills.
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Thirdly, there is a need for communication links to control these
skills.
Although no prudent person would envision a business as
usual post-attack atmosphere, a separate non-dependent commu-
nication link is in existence from government to worker through
industry. It is perhaps fortunate that Industry operates with an
organizational structure comparable to the military command
structure.
A complementary realization, gained through our national
experience in two previous wars, is that some degree of martial
law will be incurred during such a crisis.
IV. REQUIREMENT FOR INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
Industry can decrease the National post-attack recovery
time by current planning of their future course of action.
Although some industries have shown a remarkable foresight in the
assumption of this responsibility, most are remiss in the prepa-
ration and promulgation of effective plans. The efficacy of the
response of Industry may be largely dependent on the degree of
urgency expressed by the centralized Federal Authority.
Industry possesses the most reliable catalogue of the
relative degrees and types of competence attained by the indi-
viduals in their employ. After the recession of the initial post-
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attack reaction, this general capability data could assist the
efficient assignment of the available professional skills.
The numerical enormity presupposed by the analysis of indi-
vidual skills infers the utilization of a sophisticated Electronic
Data Processing system. Civil Defense Headquarters, presumed
surviving, will possess the best available post-attack damage
assessment. The degree of precision of this assessment, from
which a directed course of Federal action must be proposed, will
be a function of the accuracy of the data inputs, and the alacrity
with which such data is processed.
The cataloguing and analysis of damage to specific manu-
facturing sites is within the capability of currently existing
machines. No major redesign would be incurred in extending this
capability to include the specialized skills of the top executive
and supervisory personnel of these industrial entities. The prob-
lem is complicated only to the extent that only pertinent data
should constitute the input to the device. Skills-cataloguing
should be limited to those qualifications considered urgent during
the emergency—or initial
—
phase of reconstruction. The recovery
of normal communication channels would alleviate the exigencies of
centralized martial direction.
The degree of Federal interference required during this
industrial recovery phase will be a function of many variables.
These variables, such as a potential plant-and-worker cannibal-
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ization of one productive entity by another, can only be predicted
by astute and sophisticated analysis of pertinent data uncluttered
by unimportant trivia. This analysis should be productive of a
logical Pre-Attack Plan which would then be promulgated throughout
industry for guidance. Industrial executives could then formulate
a course of action to satisfy specific future requirements, based
on the best-available estimates of damage. This Pre-Attack Plan
should be designed to reduce, as much as is then foreseeable,
wasted productive time, money and effort. This plan must be
realistic and easily implementable to assure adequate Industrial
response.
Industrial reassurance will be dependent on the immediate







Requirement for planning : The simplest of statements may-
infer broad responsibilities • President Kennedy, in his special
television broadcast on the night of July 25, 1961 summarized
pertinent incidents leading up to his appointment of the Secretary
of Defense as Head, Civil Defense. The President prefaced this
disclosure with these words: "We have another sober responsi-
bility. To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the
missile age, without our citizens knowing what they should do or
where they should go if the bombs begin to fall, would be a failure
of responsibility."
Post-Attack autocracy : Thus, the President united at the
highest civilian level of Defense, both Military and Civil Defense.
With this executive assignment, the President has inferred the
probable execution of martial law, under Civil direction, during a
post-attack emergency.
The Secretary of Defense is evidently in agreement, for in
his statements before the House Military Operations Subcommittee
on August 1, 1961, he said: "The placing of civil defense
A. Brynes and G. Underhill, "Shelters and Survival," The
Mew Republic, (January 15, 1962), p. 7.

responsibility under the Department of Defense should facilitate a
common (Military-civilian) effort to plan for, and if necessary,
to conduct emergency operations."
Industrially oriented population ; The 180 million
population of the United States represents a specific productive
entity comprised of many variable factors. The sum total of the
effect of large scale nuclear attack on this productive entity can
not be accurately predicted.
Precision of Post-Attack assessment ; The accuracy of the
post-attack damage assessment would be a function of the then-
existing environment. Environmental limits assume essentially
simultaneous offensive detonations. The counter-strike reaction
capability of these United States assures the assessor of a
limiting offensive simultaniety of attack.
Requirement for Post-Attack Plan ; One factor limiting
detailed centralized control of all productive entities would be a
shortage of general communications during the immediate post-
attack period. A plan should be formulated and promulgated to
furnish guidance and direction during this immediate reconstruction
period.
The degree of confidence that such a plan would generate
would be a function of the realism with which it predicted the
needs and requirements of the industrial complex and the civilian
economy. The execution of such a plan presupposes an established
35

communication link. Fortunately, subjective discipline requires a
familiarity with authority. For the majority of the populace,
municipal supervision must suffice* A natural and easily accepted
propaganda communication link to the skilled individual exists via
the industrial executive chain-of-command. In this manner, the
industrial populace would constitutionally remain under familiar
civil authority.
Conclusion ;
In order to realistically appraise the post-attack damage
situation, a large quantity of data must be rapidly assimilated.
The compilation, impartial assimilation and unprejudiced analysis
of these data can best be handled utilizing Electronic Data
Processing systems. The reliability of system output will be
dependent upon the unemotional realism of data inputs. The studied
application in a peaceful academic environment would be most
productive of realistic evaluation.
The rapidity of post-attack Industrial mobilization would be
materially assisted by a specific knowledge of the immediate
requirements of the economy. Potential shortages in critical
skills, material and manufacturing capability would argue toward a
sincere effort to preclude duplication and waste.
The most efficient correlation and coordination of the
surviving productive entities would be via a centralized authority
under the direct aegis of the Chief Executive, In this manner,
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strategic essentiality could be rapidly judged and critical
national capability assessments could be made*
There is in existence in the United States, an apathetic
confusion relating to matters pertaining to Civil Defense. This
is profiled across the nation in accordance with the degree of the
immediacy of apparent target-priority. 2notionalism, rather than
realism, is the masochistic methodology of the news media. This
could be largely overcome by a national training program under
centralized direction. This should present the best available
prognosis on the strategic effects of a nuclear attack. Initial
release of realistic effects-data and strategic war-game results
could be made to responsible local and municipal governments
utilizing instructional talent available, A sophisticated
Federally administered propaganda program should be promulgated
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